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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Spencer Newell Breese appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress.

He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

because the person who conducted the search of his backpack was acting as a
government agent, not a private party, and because the search was not supported by
probable cause, and thus did not fall within the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 28, 2015, Mr. Breese was traveling on a Greyhound bus from Portland,
Oregon, to Salt Lake City, Utah, when the bus made a scheduled stop in Boise.
(Tr., p.16, L.18 – p.17, L.4.) A Greyhound employee, Ward Eversull, contacted the
Boise Police Department to advise that as he was rearranging luggage in the
compartments underneath the bus, he found a backpack that had a strong odor of
marijuana. (Tr., p.18, Ls.7-16, p.26, Ls.3-5.) Mr. Eversull requested assistance from
Officer Wall and his drug dog. (Tr., p.18, L.22 – p.19, L.3.)
Boise Police Officer Kent Lipple arrived at the bus terminal in response to
Mr. Eversull’s call, and Mr. Eversull showed Officer Lipple the suspect backpack, which
he had placed in a different compartment. (Tr., p.20, Ls.5-8.) Officer Lipple said, “I
don’t smell it.” Mr. Eversull felt the outside of the bag and said, “I feel something right
here.” (Tr., p.28, Ls.4-16.) Officer Lipple asked, “You can still smell it?” Mr. Eversull
responded, stating he “just found it”—he “got [his] hands on it.” Mr. Eversull opened the
backpack in the presence of Officer Lipple and found three plastic bags containing a
1

green leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana. (Tr., p.21, L.19 – p.23, L.1.) The
backpack had a tag on it identifying Mr. Breese as its owner.

(Tr., p.22, Ls.8-11.)

Mr. Breese was paged through the public address system at the bus terminal.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.12-18.) Mr. Breese identified the backpack as his, admitted the backpack
contained marijuana, and was arrested. (Tr., p.24, Ls.16-20.)
Mr. Breese was charged by Information with one count of trafficking in marijuana.
(R., pp.18-19.) He filed a motion to suppress challenging the search of his backpack as
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.1

(R., pp.24-25, 28-39.)

The State filed a

memorandum in opposition to Mr. Breese’s motion. (R., pp.49-59.) The district court
held a hearing on Mr. Breese’s motion, at which Mr. Eversull testified for the State and
the district court admitted into evidence an audio recording of the interaction between
Mr. Eversull and Officer Lipple at the bus terminal.2 (R., pp.60-63; Tr. p.6, Ls1-7; Mot.
to Augment, Ex. A., 3:37:15-3:41:47.)

Following the hearing, the parties submitted

supplemental briefs to the district court. (R., pp.64-66, 67-74.)
On August 27, 2015, the district court issued a memorandum decision and order
denying Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.76-87.) Mr. Breese subsequently pled
guilty to trafficking in marijuana, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. (R., pp.90, 95.) The district court sentenced Mr. Breese to one year fixed,

Mr. Breese also argued that he was questioned without being advised of his rights
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (R., pp.34-35.) Counsel for
Mr. Breese abandoned this issue at the suppression hearing. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.)
2 The Clerk’s Record does not contain a copy of this audio recording. Simultaneously
with the filing of this Brief, Mr. Breese is filing a Motion to Augment to include in the
Record a copy of the audio recording of the hearing on Mr. Breese’s motion to
suppress, during which counsel for Mr. Breese played the relevant portion of the audio
recording of the interaction between Mr. Eversull and Officer Lipple.
1

2

the mandatory minimum, and imposed a $5,000 fine. See I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1)(A).
(R., p.99.) The judgment was entered on November 3, 2015, and Mr. Breese filed a
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.100-04, 109-11.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Breese’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress because it concluded

that Mr. Eversull was not acting as a government agent when he searched Mr. Breese’s
backpack, and the search thus did not implicate Mr. Breese’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment. (R., pp.79-83.) The district court also concluded that even if Mr. Eversull
was acting as a government agent when he searched Mr. Breese’s backpack, the
search was authorized pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
because it was supported by probable cause. (R., pp.83-86.) The district court erred in
both respects.

Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent when he searched

Mr. Breese’s backpack because Officer Lipple knew of and acquiesced in the search,
and because Mr. Eversull’s intent was to assist law enforcement. Further, the search of
Mr. Breese’s backpack was not authorized pursuant to the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement because Mr. Eversull’s alleged detection of an odor of marijuana
did not provide probable cause for the search. The district court thus erred in denying
Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a

motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). The Court will accept
the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157
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Idaho 416, 418 (2014). However, the Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
C.

The Search of Mr. Breese’s Backpack Implicated His Rights Under The Fourth
Amendment Because The Greyhound Employee Who Conducted The Search
Was Acting As A Government Agent, Not A Private Party
The district court denied Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress because it concluded

that Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent, not a private party, when he
conducted the search, and the search thus did not implicate Mr. Breese’s rights under
the Fourth Amendment. (R., pp.79-83.) The district court is correct that a search by a
private party does not implicate the Fourth Amendment; however, it is clear under
established precedent that Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent at the time of
the search, and the search thus implicates Mr. Breese’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment.
“It is firmly established that evidence obtained through a private search, even
though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable under the fourth amendment unless
government officials instigated the search or otherwise participated in a wrongful
search.”

State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 517 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).

“However, where a private party acts as an instrument or agent of the state in effecting
a search or seizure, fourth amendment interests are implicated.” Id. (citation omitted).
“The burden of proving governmental involvement in a search conducted by a private
citizen rests on the party objecting to the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
This case falls within the “grey area” between the extremes of overt
governmental participation in a search and the complete absence of such participation.
See id.; see also United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1994). Cases such

6

as this one must be resolved on a “case-by-case basis.” See Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 51.
“In analyzing whether the person conducting the search is acting as a government
agent, two critical factors must be considered:

(1) government knowledge and

acquiescence, and (2) the private party’s intent in making the search.”

Id. (citation

omitted); see also Reed, 15 F.3d at 931.
The search of Mr. Breese’s backpack meets the first of these two requirements—
government knowledge and acquiescence—because Officer Lipple knew of and
acquiesced in the search. Officer Lipple was personally present during the search and
knew exactly what Mr. Eversull was doing as he was doing it. See Reed, 15 F.3d at
931 (concluding search of defendant’s hotel room “obviously met” the first requirement
where, among other things, two police officers “were personally present during the
search, [and] knew exactly what [the hotel employee] was doing as he was doing it”).
The district court concluded that Officer Lipple did not acquiesce in the search
because his participation “was minimal.”

(R., p.81.)

The district court explained,

“Although Eversull vocalized his findings as he searched the backpack, at no time did
Cpl. Lipple direct or encourage Eversull to search the backpack or touch the backpack
himself.” (R., p.82.) To acquiesce is “to accept, comply or submit tacitly or passively.”
See

Merriam

Webster’s

Online

Dictionary,

at

http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/acquiescing (last visited 2/5/16); see also State v. Glushko, 266
P.3d 50, 58 (Or. 2011) (quoting dictionary definition of “acquiescence” as “silent or
passive assent to, or compliance with, proposals or measures”); United States v.
Marchesano, 67 M.J. 535, 543 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting dictionary definition
of “acquiesce” as “to accept tacitly or passively; to give implied consent to an act” and
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noting that active participation or engagement is not required); Aguilar Gonzalez v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2008) (Smith, dissenting) (quoting dictionary
definition of “acquiescence” as “[a] person’s tacit or passive acceptance” or “implied
consent to an act”).

Officer Lipple acquiesced in the search even though his

participation was minimal and he neither directed nor encouraged it, because he
accepted the search and allowed it to happen. That is sufficient for acquiescence.
The next factor to consider is Mr. Eversull’s intent in making the search—
specifically, whether he intended to further his own ends or to assist law enforcement
efforts. See Reed, 15 F.3d at 931. The district court concluded that Mr. Eversull’s
reasons for doing the search “were entirely personal” because his “primary motivation
for conducting the search was to pursue Greyhound’s interest in deterring the
transportation of illegal or dangerous substances.” (R., pp.82-83.) This conclusion is
contradicted by Mr. Eversull’s testimony at the suppression hearing.
At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor asked Mr. Eversull, “Why do you
prefer to have law enforcement present when you believe luggage contains controlled
substances?” (Tr., p.18, Ls.17-19.) Mr. Eversull responded, “Because I never know
what the quantities are going to be.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.20-21.) The district court followed up
on this question with Mr. Breese:
The Court:

Help me understand why it is you wanted law enforcement
there when you opened the bag that you were concerned
about.

[Mr. Breese]: One, I’m never sure what the quantity is and I’m not—don’t
know that the legal—I know it’s illegal as a substance. I’m
not sure when I’m smelling it in a bag what the quantity is.
The Court:

Does the quantity make a difference in terms of whether or
not—what Greyhound is going to do?
8

[Mr. Breese]: No, it would be a difference on what the policy on what the
law enforcement is going to do with it.
(Tr., p.37, L.16 – p.38, L.3.)
It is clear from this testimony that Mr. Eversull intended to assist law enforcement
efforts in searching Mr. Breese’s backpack.

Mr. Eversull wanted law enforcement

present for the search because he did not know “what the quantities are going to be”
and the quantity made a difference “on what the law enforcement is going to do with it.”
The district court stated in its memorandum decision that Mr. Eversull “expressed
discomfort, as a private citizen, with potentially being in possession of a large amount of
contraband.”

(R., p.83.)

This is pure speculation.

Mr. Eversull never expressed

discomfort with being in possession of a large quantity of contraband—instead, he
expressed an intent to assist law enforcement.
In United States v. Gomez, 614 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that an airline employee’s search of a suitcase which had apparently
been misplaced was a private search even though a county detective physically carried
the suitcase to the employee’s working area because the airline had a legitimate
interest in identifying the owner of the luggage. Similarly, in United States v. Humphrey,
549 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit held that an airline employee’s search of
an obviously damaged package was a private search even though a police officer had
suggested it might be a “good idea” to open the package because the airline had a
legitimate interest in preventing fraudulent loss claims. In Gomez and Humphrey, there
was no indication (and certainly no testimony) that the employees who conducted the
respective searches intended to assist law enforcement.

Here, it is clear that

Mr. Eversull wanted to assist law enforcement in conducting the search of Mr. Breese’s
9

backpack. He wanted a police officer present to determine the amount of marijuana so
that the officer could determine “what . . . to do with it.” (Tr., p.38, Ls.1-3.)
Because Officer Lipple knew of and acquiesced in the search of Mr. Breese’s
backpack, and because Mr. Eversull intended to assist law enforcement in conducting
the search, Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent at the time of the search.
The search thus implicated Mr. Breese’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and, as
discussed below, violated those rights because it was not supported by probable cause.
D.

The Search Of Mr. Breese’s Backpack Was Not Authorized Pursuant To The
Automobile Exception To The Warrant Requirement Because It Was Not
Supported By Probable Cause
In denying Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress, the district court held that even if

Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent when he searched Mr. Breese’s
backpack, the search did not violate Mr. Breese’s rights under the Fourth Amendment
because it “was authorized pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.” (R., p.83.) Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the warrantless
search of Mr. Breese’s backpack was not authorized pursuant to the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement because it was not supported by probable cause.
Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a warrant is not
required to search a vehicle “when there is probable cause to conclude that the vehicle
contains evidence of a crime, and exigent circumstances exist due to the vehicle’s
mobility and likelihood the evidence may be lost or destroyed.” State v. Gonzales, 117
Idaho 518, 519 (1990). The district court concluded that the search of Mr. Breese’s
backpack was supported by probable cause because Mr. Eversull smelled marijuana
emanating from the backpack. The fact that Mr. Eversull allegedly smelled marijuana
10

did not establish probable cause for the search because Mr. Eversull was not trained in
drug detection and because Officer Lipple did not detect an odor of marijuana.
In Gonzales, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to suppress where the defendant “[did not] dispute the district court’s finding that
the officer was trained to recognize by smell the presence of ‘raw marijuana.’” 117
Idaho at 519. The Gonzales Court reasoned that “[a]n officer may draw reasonable
inferences to establish probable cause from related experience and law enforcement
training.” Id. Gonzales thus stands for the proposition that probable cause for a search
exists when a trained officer detects the smell of marijuana. The present case is clearly
distinguishable from Gonzales because the person who allegedly smelled marijuana—
Mr. Eversull—was neither trained in drug detection nor a police officer, and the police
officer on scene, who presumably was trained in drug detection, did not smell
marijuana.
The district court apparently believed that Mr. Eversull’s sense of smell was
sufficiently reliable to support a finding of probable cause. The district court stated in its
memorandum decision that Mr. Eversull had “significant past experience with marijuana
detection” because “[o]n ‘several’ occasions over the past few years, his identification of
marijuana by odor alone has been successfully confirmed by either law enforcement
searches or his own searches.” (R., p.11.) This is not an accurate characterization of
Mr. Eversull’s testimony and overstates his qualifications.
At the suppression hearing, Mr. Eversull testified that he had worked for
Greyhound for over ten years. (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-15.) He was asked on direct, “Is this
[smell of marijuana] a smell that you have reported to law enforcement in the past?” He
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answered, “Several times in the past, yes.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.23-25.) Mr. Eversull did not
indicate the number of times he had reported a smell of marijuana to law enforcement;
nor did he indicate how many times his reports had turned out to be true, and how many
times, if any, they had turned out to be false. The district court asked Mr. Eversull about
his experience recognizing the smell of marijuana, but the exchange was brief:
Q.

How did you recognize it as the odor of marijuana?

A.

Because marijuana has a very distinct odor to it.

Q.

How are you familiar with the odor of marijuana?

A.

I grew up –

(Tr., p.34, Ls.17-22.)

At this point, the prosecutor requested that the district court

advise Mr. Eversull of his privilege against self-incrimination. (Tr., p.34, L.23 – p.34,
L.2.) The district court responded that it did not want to “open a can of worms that
doesn’t need to be opened” and withdrew its question. (Tr., p.35, Ls.3-7.) The following
exchange then took place on redirect:
Q.

In your line of work you indicated that you’ve called law
enforcement on previous occasions related to controlled
substances; is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And when you have called law enforcement, have you ever in the
past suspected an odor to be that of marijuana?

A.

That wasn’t marijuana?

Q.

No. Let me rephrase the question. Have you ever called law
enforcement believing to have smelled marijuana in a bag?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you been present for law enforcement searching the bag that
you believed contained marijuana?
12

A.

Yes.

Q.

And on prior occasions, has your suspicion that a bag smells like
marijuana been confirmed by law enforcement using a dog or you
yourself searching and finding marijuana?

A.

Yes to both questions.

Q.

And . . . [d]id it smell to you on the 28 th as it had in previously [sic]
instances where you had called law enforcement based on the
smell?

A.

Yes, it has a very distinctive odor to it.

(Tr., p.19, L.15 – p.20, L.16.)
It is clear from Mr. Eversull’s testimony, quoted above, that Mr. Eversull has
some experience detecting marijuana in luggage. But it is not accurate to characterize
his experience as “significant,” as the district court did.

(R., p.11.)

We have no

indication how many times Mr. Eversull has detected marijuana over the course of his
ten-year career. It does not appear that Mr. Eversull has ever received training in drug
detection, and it is unclear whether he is aware of the distinction between raw and
burned marijuana. These facts alone distinguish this case from those relied upon by the
district court. See United States v. Pond, 523 F.2d 210, 211 (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming
denial of motion to suppress where officer obtained search warrant from an affidavit
based on station agent’s report of the odor of marijuana in checked luggage, where the
station agent “had accurately detected marijuana using his sense of smell as a
determining clue in approximately half of 25 to 30 cases in which he had provided
information to federal authorities”); State v. Vonhof, 751 P.2d 1221, 1225-26 (Wash.
App. 1988) (finding no abuse of discretion in magistrate’s issuance of search warrant
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where affiant “specifically described the odor [of growing marijuana], and . . . stated he
had smelled mature or growing marijuana at least 10 times before”).
More importantly, the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Eversull’s alleged
detection of the odor of marijuana was sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause for
the search of Mr. Breese’s backpack does not account for Officer Lipple’s testimony that
he did not detect an odor of marijuana. (Mot. to Augment, Ex. A., 3:38:39-3:39:25.)
None of the cases relied upon by the district court suggest that probable cause exists
where a non-police officer allegedly detects an odor of marijuana, but a trained police
officer does not. The district court addressed this point in a footnote, but its reasoning is
unpersuasive. The court stated:
The fact that Cpl. Lipple could not smell the marijuana when he arrived on
scene does not affect this Court’s conclusion regarding probable cause.
Namely, when Eversull initially smelled the marijuana, the backpack had
been confined in a closed compartment for several hours, rending [sic] the
odor more pungent. When Cpl. Lipple arrived, the compartment had been
opened and the backpack moved to the top of a pile of baggage in a new
bin, thus exposed to open air which would have allowed the odor to
dissipate.
Indeed, having smelled marijuana emanating from the
compartment when Eversull first opened it, his report to law enforcement
gave probable cause to search all of the containers on the bus that could
contain marijuana, not just the one from which Eversull believed the smell
was emanating.
(R., p.86.) It cannot be the case that a court can simply credit the report of an untrained
citizen over the report of a trained police officer to find probable cause. In the context of
the detection of the odor of marijuana, training is significant. Indeed, at least one court
has held that a police officer who had some training in drug detection did not have
enough training to detect the odor of raw marijuana. See State v. Holley, 899 N.E.2d
31, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming grant of defendant’s motion to suppress where the
officer in question “testified that he had attended [only] one seminar where he was
14

shown what raw marijuana looked like” and “[t]here was no evidence that [the officer]
had any formal training regarding the detection of raw marijuana by odor”).
“Probable cause is established when the totality of the circumstances known to
the officer at the time of the search would give rise—in the mind of a reasonable
person—to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012). A reasonable person
would not conclude that a person who was not a police officer and was not trained in
drug detection would be able to detect marijuana in a closed backpack, when a police
officer who presumably was trained in drug detection could detect no such odor. On the
record presented, the district court erred in concluding that the search of Mr. Breese’s
backpack was supported by probable cause, and thus erred in concluding the search
was permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Breese respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 7th day of March, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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